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1 Introduction
Prices of financial assets are typically more volatile than real economic activity. As a
result, it is often impossible to associate asset price fluctuations with news regarding
dividends underlying the asset. This excess volatility of asset prices with respect to divi-
dends has been documented in many studies, such as Shiller (1981), Campbell and Shiller
(1987), West (1988), or the survey by Gilles and LeRoy (1991). The behavioral finance
literature has proposed various models to accommodate this excess volatility as well as
other market anomalies (See e.g. the surveys by Hirshleifer, 2001, Barberis and Thaler,
2003, and Shiller, 2003). In such models, price movements can occur due to investor sen-
timent rather than fundamental news. Agents may make investment decisions based on
expected price movements in the short run rather than expected dividends in the long run
and often form non-rational expectations based on limited information sets and underpa-
rameterized models (See e.g. De Long et al., 1990a,b, Barberis et al., 1998, or Hong and
Stein, 1999).
I consider a simple asset pricing model with three types of agents: Rational long-term
investors, rational speculators and contrarians. These agents are allowed to have hetero-
geneous investment horizons and may form heterogeneous expectations regarding short-
term price movements. Nevertheless, all three types hold identical information sets and
have their expectation formation mechanisms anchored in the same vector autoregressive
(VAR) representation of prices and dividends. The model can therefore be evaluated em-
pirically using the VAR approach for testing present value models, pioneered by Campbell
and Shiller (1987, 1988), for which I use a dataset containing annual observations on the
S&P500 index and underlying dividends for the period 1871-20111. Even if there is no
disagreement at all among the agents regarding expected dividends, the model is able to
generate prices far more volatile than the standard present value model. Statistical tests
indicate that the model is preferred to alternative representative agent models.
The first two agent types both act in accordance with the standard present value model.
1Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller
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The only characteristic separating these agents is their investment horizon. The first type
makes long-term investments and therefore values assets according to the cash flows (div-
idends) that the asset is expected to generate. I refer to agents of this type as rational
long-term investors, while the term fundamentalism is also used in the literature to de-
scribe this behavior.
The second type is only interested in one-period returns, so that the main determinant
of the asset’s current value is the expected selling price in the next period. This speculative
behavior is similar to that of the trend followers or the momentum traders considered in
the literature, for example by Brock and Hommes (1998), or Hong and Stein (1999). How-
ever, while trend followers and momentum traders in general form expectations based on
a simple univariate model and a limited information set, typically by extrapolating recent
returns, the short-term investors considered in this paper form expectations by using the
exact same model and information set as the rational long-term investors. I therefore refer
to these agents as rational speculators.
I refer to the first two types of agents as rational, even if they are, strictly speaking,
boundedly rational. Their expectation formation mechanism is based on a VAR model.
These expectations would be fully rational if the VAR is the true data generating process.
Although I show that the VAR provides an appropriate characterization of the data, it
remains only an approximation, which does not take all aspects of the data generating
process, such as the existence and strategies of other agents, explicitly into account.
The third type of agent also follows a short-term strategy. Regarding expected price
changes, however, this type takes the exact opposite, or contrarian, stance from the ra-
tional speculators. These agents are therefore referred to as contrarian speculators, or
contrarians. When the rational speculators expect an x% increase in the price, the contrar-
ians expect an x% decrease and vice versa.
Several studies provide empirical evidence showing that agents do indeed sometimes
embark on such contrarian strategies, (e.g. Kaniel et al., 2008, or Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2000), which is further supported by experimental evidence by Bloomfield et al. (2009).
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In addition, Park and Sabourian (2011) provide a theoretical justification of contrarian
behavior, while Lakonishok et al. (1994), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), and Dechow and
Sloan (1997) discuss the profitability of such strategies. This paper does not provide a
theory or intuition for contrarian behavior. Instead, I motivate the existence of contrari-
ans empirically, by showing that observed market dynamics can be replicated rather well
when a certain fraction of market participants is forming contrarian expectations. While
the existence of rational speculators can explain much of the volatility observed on finan-
cial markets, the contrarians turn out to be an essential element of the model in order to
approximate observed prices also in terms of correlation.
Contrarian beliefs are in particular helpful in explaining the high valuations that the
stock market reached at the end of the 1990s, mainly driven by technology stocks. Whether
this episode constituted a bubble has been the subject of debate among many authors, in-
cluding Ofek and Richardson (2003), Pástor and Veronesi (2006), Bradley et al. (2008),
O’Hara (2008) and Phillips et al. (2011). The results in this paper indicate that dividend
expectations are not the dominant factor in the observed price increases during the 1990s.
In this sense, it could be justified to classify this event as a bubble. Nevertheless, it was not
a rational bubble as defined by Blanchard and Watson (1982), since the results show that
rational speculators would have driven the market in the opposite direction. Instead, the
observed dynamics of the 1990s can be closely approximated by the contrarian valuation
model, suggesting that nonrational beliefs inflated this bubble.
To capture the observed regime switching behavior of financial markets (documented
by e.g. Ang and Bekaert, 2002, or Guidolin and Timmermann, 2008), I allow the agents to
switch between strategies. Agents are assumed to observe the recent performance of each
strategy and choose their own strategy accordingly, following the evolutionary selection
scheme introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). This scheme has been applied in
many theoretical and empirical studies of heterogeneous agent models in finance, includ-
ing Boswijk et al. (2007), Branch and Evans (2010) and Lof (2012b). Similar concepts, in
which agents apply learning principles to update expectations are considered by Timmer-
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man (1994), Hong et al. (2007), and Branch and Evans (2011), among others. Hommes
et al. (2005) and Bloomfield and Hales (2002) provide experimental evidence in favor of
such principles being applied in the formation of expectations. Alternatively, the fractions
of different types of agents may be held constant (Szafarz, 2012), or vary according to an
exogenous process, such as the business cycle (Lof, 2012a).
The VAR approach for testing present value models is recently applied by Cornea
et al. (2012) to a heterogeneous agent model of the New Keynesian Philips curve, in
which price-setters are allowed to switch between forward looking and naive inflation
expectations. Only the expectations of the forward looking price-setters are evaluated
using the VAR approach, since the naive expectations are not model-based. In this paper,
on the other hand, I let all three types of agents form expectations based on the same VAR
framework.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the present value model,
the concept of rational bubbles and the log-linear approximation by Campbell and Shiller
(1988). In Section 3, the VAR approach is reviewed and applied to three representative
agent models, in which the representative agent is either a rational long-term investor, a
rational speculator or a contrarian. In Section 4, these models are merged into one regime
switching model. The section further includes estimation results and specification tests.
In Section 5, the model is generalized to allow for time-varying discount factors. Section
6 concludes.
2 The present value model and rational bubbles
According to the standard present value model, the price of an asset should equal the
discounted present value of the cash flows (dividends) that an asset is expected to generate:
Pt =
∞
∑
i=1
δ iEt [Dt+i] , (1)
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in which which Pt refers to the asset price and Dt to its underlying dividend. The discount
factor δ is for simplicity assumed to be constant. In Section 5, I examine the validity
of this assumption by considering several time-varying discount factors. Assuming ra-
tionality and market efficiency requires that the conditional expectation operator Et [·] is
the optimal prediction conditional on all available information. Because in equation (1),
the value is entirely determined by expected dividends, or fundamentals, this expression
is sometimes referred to as the fundamental value which would be equal to the observed
market price if all agents are rational fundamentalists (e.g. Szafarz, 2012).
Agents are not necessarily planning to hold the asset for a long period and may be
more interested in the short-term trading profits rather than long-term dividend yields. If
agents are planning to hold the asset for a short time only, say one period, the value of
the asset should equal the discounted sum of the expected dividend paid out in the next
period and the expected price at which the asset can be sold subsequently:
Pt = δEt [Pt+1+Dt+1] . (2)
The long-term model (1) is the solution to the short-term model (2) under the following
transversality condition:
lim
i→∞
δ iPt+i = 0. (3)
Hence, under this transversality condition the investment horizon of the agents should not
have an impact on the price. However, equation (2) has a more general solution which
does allow for a discrepancy between equations (1) and (2):
Pt =
∞
∑
i=1
δ iEt [Dt+i]+Ct , (4)
in which Ct ≡ δ−1Ct−1, or equivalently, Ct ≡ δ−tMt , in which Mt may be any martingale
process (i.e. Et [Mt+1] = Mt). Because Ct constitutes a discrepancy between the funda-
mental value and the observed price, it may be referred to as a bubble. However, since the
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bubble exists due to a violation of the transversality condition rather than the a violation of
rationality, Blanchard and Watson (1982) name it a rational bubble. The finding that ratio-
nal dividend expectations are not sufficiently volatile to explain observed price volatility
can be regarded as a rejection of the present value model (1) and is often interpreted as
evidence in favor of rational bubbles (Gürkaynak, 2008).
Two recent studies present theoretical analyses of asset pricing models in which long-
term fundamentalists and short-term speculators co-exist. Szafarz (2012) finds that the
existence of multiple investment horizons is a potential source of price volatility. Anufriev
and Bottazzi (2012), however, argue that variation in the investment horizon has a signifi-
cant effect on market dynamics only when agents hold heterogeneous expectations about
future prices. In this paper, I follow an empirical approach by applying the VAR-based
tests of present value models by Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988) to an asset pricing
model with heterogeneity in both investment horizons and expectations. As will become
evident in the next section, heterogeneity in investment horizons can explain the high
level of volatility observed in stock prices. Nevertheless, heterogeneity in expectations
appears to be a crucial element required for generating prices that do not only capture the
volatility but also obtain a relatively high correlation with observed stock prices.
Before proceeding to estimation of the VAR it is preferable to apply the log-linear
approximation of the present value model derived by Campbell and Shiller (1988). The
return on holding an asset for one period (Rt+1 = (Pt+1+Dt+1)/Pt) can be approximated
by a linear equation:
rt+1 = ρ pt+1− pt +(1−ρ)dt+1+ k, (5)
in which pt ≡ log(Pt) , dt ≡ log(Dt) and rt ≡ log(Rt) . The parameter ρ is below, but
close to, one: It denotes the mean of the ratio PtPt+Dt , which Campbell and Shiller (1988)
assume to be approximately constant over time. Following Campbell and Shiller (1988),
the constant term k is ignored in much of the analysis below, because explaining price
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movements rather than levels, is the main objective of this study. Engsted et al. (2012)
show by simulation that these log-linear returns are a close approximation to true returns
even in the presence of rational bubbles.
The assumption of a constant discount factor as in equations (1)-(2) implies that ex-
pected returns are constant:
Et [Rt+1] =
Et [Pt+1+Dt+1]
Pt
= δ−1. (6)
Taking conditional expectations on both sides of equation (5), substituting constant ex-
pected returns (Et [rt+1]≡ r¯) and re-arranging gives:
yt = ρEt [yt+1]+Et [4dt+1]+ k− r¯, (7)
in which yt ≡ pt − dt denotes the log price-dividend (PD) ratio. Equation (7) can be
iterated forward to obtain the long-term interpretation of the present value model, in which
the valuation of the asset is determined by expected future dividend growth rates:
yt =
∞
∑
i=0
ρ iEt [4dt+1+i]+ k− r¯1−ρ . (8)
This solution requires the assumption of a transversality condition:
lim
i→∞
ρ iyt+i = 0, (9)
which, like condition (3), excludes the possibility of a rational bubble. Equation (8) can
be interpreted as the log-linear equivalent of (1).
It is also possible to derive a short-term interpretation of the log-linear present value
model, in which the value of an asset is determined by the expected return of holding the
asset for one period. Subtracting ρyt from equation (7) and dividing both sides by 1−ρ
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gives:
yt =
ρ
1−ρEt [4yt+1]+
1
1−ρEt [4dt+1]+
k− r¯
1−ρ , (10)
or, since4yt =4pt−4dt :
yt =
ρ
1−ρEt [4pt+1]+Et [4dt+1]+
k− r¯
1−ρ . (11)
In this model the PD ratio is entirely determined by one-period expectations of the change
in the price and dividend. Since the parameter ρ is below but close to one, the ratio ρ1−ρ
is a rather large number, implying that the expected price change is the dominant factor
in the valuation of the asset. Dividend expectations therefore only play a minor role in
this short-term valuation model, akin to the models by Hong et al. (2007) and Branch and
Evans (2010), in which agents have the option to omit dividends partly or entirely from
their expectation formation mechanism.
Unlike the long-term model (8), the short-term model (11) does not require the transver-
sality condition (9) and therefore allows for the existence of a rational bubble. In the next
section, I evaluate both models (8) and (11) using the VAR approach by Campbell and
Shiller (1987, 1988).
3 The VAR approach
Campbell and Shiller (1988) propose to test the log-linear present value model (8) based
on an estimated VAR(q) for the PD ratio and the dividend growth rate:
vt ≡
 yt
4dt
 = q∑
i=0
Aivt−1+ut . (12)
Both the PD ratio and the dividend growth rate are demeaned so that intercept terms are
not required and the parameters k and r¯ in (8) can be disregarded. I estimate a VAR(2)
for annual observations of the PD ratio and the dividend growth rate over the period
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1872-2011. The lag length of q = 2, is selected using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). This lag order is consistent with the results of Campbell and Shiller (1988). Table
1 depicts the AIC for different lag lengths, as well as diagnostic tests for the selected
VAR(2). The second-order VAR seems to describe the data well as there is no sign of
autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Moreover, the results of a Chow
forecast test at several potential break points indicate that parameter constancy can not be
rejected.
TABLE 1: VAR specification and diagnostics
lags 1 2 3 4 5 6
AIC -7.980 -7.986 -7.967 -7.953 -7.889 -7.889
Autocorrelation 17.63 (0.612)
Heteroscedasticity 51.62 (0.231)
Breakpoint 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
Chow FC 0.578 0.403 0.345 0.998 0.976 0.624
Notes: VAR(q) model (12), with annual data for 1872-2011. Top: Lag selection based on Akaike infor-
mation criterion. Middle: LM-type test statistics (p-values in parentheses) for Autocorrelation (5 lags) and
Multivariate ARCH (5 lags) in residuals of VAR(2). Bottom: P-values for Chow forecast test for parameter
constancy. All three diagnostic tests are executed with JMulti (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004)
In order to proceed with testing the present value model, it is convenient to consider
the VAR(2) model in its companion form:
 vt
vt−1
 =
 A1 A2
I2 O2,2

 vt−1
vt−2
+
 ut
O2,1
 , (13)
or:
zt = Bzt−1+ εt , (14)
in which zt ≡ (vt ,vt−1)′ . If this VAR provides an accurate description of the data, which
the diagnostics in Table 1 indeed suggest, the matrix of estimated parameters B can be
used to replicate the conditional expectations in equation (8), and to compute a time-
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series of theoretical PD ratios:
yrlt =
∞
∑
i=0
ρ iEt [4dt+1+i] =
∞
∑
i=0
ρ i
(
e′2B
izt
)
= e′2B(I−ρB)−1 zt ,
(15)
in which ei is a vector of zeros in which the ith element is replaced by one. A full deriva-
tion is provided Campbell and Shiller (1988). The superscript rl to the theoretical PD ratio
indicates rational and long-term. The generated theoretical PD ratio can be interpreted as
an estimate of how the PD ratio would behave if all agents are rational long-term investors,
that value assets according to rational expectations of future dividends.
For now, the parameter ρ is calibrated at a fixed value, as in Campbell and Shiller
(1988). I set ρ = 0.958 which is the sample average of the ratio PtPt+Dt . At the end of this
section, I discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to this calibration.
Figure 1 shows the theoretical PD ratio (yrlt ), as well as the realized PD ratio (yt).
The figure looks similar to the charts in Campbell and Shiller (1987). The theoretical PD
ratio is quite strongly correlated with the realized PD ratio (corr
(
yrlt ,yt
)
= 0.799), but
the volatility of the theoretical PD ratio falls far behind of observed volatility. This is
illustrated by the volatility ratio (σ
(
yrlt
)
/σ (yt) = 0.135), which expresses the standard
deviation of the theoretical PD ratio as a fraction of the standard deviation of the realized
PD ratio. The long-term present value model (15) therefore seems able to explain the di-
rection of the stock market, but lacks explanatory power regarding the observed volatility
of the stock market. Already in the 1980s, Campbell and Shiller, among others, inter-
preted this excess volatility as a rejection of present value models. In fact, as Figure 1
shows, the discrepancy between the theoretical and observed PD ratio has only increased
further since then, with an unprecedented rise in the PD ratio during the 1990s, which the
present value model fails to capture.
The VAR approach can also be applied to the short-term model (11), which is the
correct model if all agents are rational speculators. These agents are speculators, as they
are mainly interested in short-term trading profits rather than in the dividends the asset
10
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Figure 1: Observed PD ratio (yt) and theoretical PD ratio (yrlt ), from long-term model (15), with
ρ = 0.958. corr
(
yt ,yrlt
)
= 0.799.
σ
(
yrlt
)
σ (yt)
= 0.135.
generates in the long run. They can be considered (boundedly) rational, however, as
they form expectations using the same information set and VAR model as the long-term
investors considered above. The conditional expectations of these rational speculators (rs)
can therefore be replicated based on the estimated VAR, similar as above:
yrst =
ρ
1−ρEt [4pt+1]+Et [4dt+1] , (16)
in which:
Et [4dt+1] = e′2Bzt , (17)
and:
Et [4pt+1] = Et [4yt+1]+Et [4dt+1]
= Et [yt+1]− yt +Et [4dt+1]
= e′1 (B− I)zt + e′2Bzt .
(18)
In addition, I consider the valuation model according to a second type of speculator:
Contrarian speculators (cs) or simply: Contrarians. These agents agree with the rational
agents on expected dividends, but form alternative expectations on expected changes in
prices:
ycst =
ρ
1−ρ E˜
cs
t [4pt+1]+Et [4dt+1] . (19)
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Figure 2: Observed PD ratio (yt) and theoretical PD ratio (yrst ), from rational speculative model
(16), with ρ = 0.958. corr (yt ,yrst ) =−0.403.
σ (yrst )
σ (yt)
= 2.065.
In fact, regarding the expected price change, contrarians take the exact opposite stance
from the rational speculators:
E˜cst [4pt+1] = −Et [4pt+1] . (20)
Figure 2 shows yrst and yt . The model with rational speculative expectations (16) appears
able to generate large price fluctuations, with the volatility of the theoretical PD ratio even
overshooting observed volatility (σ (yrst )/σ (yt) = 2.065). Nevertheless, the correlation
with the observed PD ratios is very weak, even negative (corr (yrst ,yt) = −0.403). From
Figure 2, it can be seen that during several episodes, most notably the 1990s, the theo-
retical PD ratio moves in the opposite direction from the observed PD ratio. The rational
speculative model (16) therefore fails to explain the 1990s bull market any better than the
long-term model (15) does.
Figure 3 shows the empirical need for a model with contrarian expectations. The
theoretical PD ratio ycst , which is generated by model (19), nearly matches y
rs
t in terms
of volatility: (σ (ycst )/σ (yt) = 1.977). Unlike the rational speculative model, however,
the contrarian model generates a PD ratio that is positively correlated with the observed
PD ratio (corr (ycst ,yt) = 0.447). Although this correlation remains quite low compared to
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Figure 3: Observed PD ratio (yt) and theoretical PD ratio (ycst ), from contrarian model (19), with
ρ = 0.958. corr (yt ,ycst ) = 0.447.
σ (ycst )
σ (yt)
= 1.977.
the long-term model (15), it is evident from Figure 3 that in recent decades the contrarian
model traces the observed PD ratio remarkably well.
Based on Figure 1, it can be argued that the bull market in the 1990s was a bubble. It
was, however, not a rational bubble, as in that case the rational speculative model (Figure
2) should be able to replicate the bubble. Instead, I find that the model requires nonra-
tional, or contrarian, beliefs in order to explain the 1990s bubble.
It is evident from Figures 1-3 that the performance (or fit) of the three alternative
models changes over time, which could indicate misspecification of the VAR, due to the
existence of structural breaks or time-varying parameters. The diagnostic tests presented


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

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y
y{rl}





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y
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
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y
y{cs}
Figure 4: Observed PD ratio (yt) and theoretical PD ratio (yrlt , yrst , and ycst ), from models (15),
(16), and (19), for 1972-2011.
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Figure 5: corr
(
yt ,y
j
t
)
and
σ
(
y jt
)
σ (yt)
for different values of ρ , for j = rl (left), j = rs (middle) and
j = cs (right)
in Table 1, however, indicate that the VAR is correctly specified. In addition, I estimate the
VAR and generate yrlt , y
rs
t and y
cs
t again for the last 40 years in the sample only, which are
presented in Figure 4. These plots tell a roughly similar story as Figures 1-3, suggesting
that the time-varying performance of the three models is not the result of misspecification
of the VAR.
Instead, the time-varying fit of the three models could indicate that the market is sub-
ject to regime switching behavior, with agents switching between the long-term strategy
based on expected dividends, and more speculative (rational or contrarian) strategies. In
the next section, I therefore combine equations (15), (16) and (19) into one regime switch-
ing model, in which the asset price is determined by the interaction of rational long-term
investors, rational speculators and contrarians.
So far, the parameter ρ is calibrated at the sample average of the ratio PtPt+Dt . The
obtained results are somewhat sensitive to this calibration. This is illustrated in Figure 5,
which shows volatility ratios and the correlation between realized and theoretical PD ra-
tios, for different values of ρ , for all three models. For the long-run model, the sensitivity
with respect to ρ is rather modest. Campbell and Shiller (1988) make the same obser-
vation. For the speculative models, however, small changes in ρ do have a great impact.
Calibrating ρ and disregarding its uncertainty seems therefore inappropriate. Instead, I
estimate ρ in the remainder of this paper jointly with the other parameters in the model.
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4 Heterogeneous agents
The results in the previous section indicate that the long-run present value model (15) can
explain the direction of stock market movements, but not its excess volatility. The spec-
ulative models (16) and (19) are able to generate sufficient volatility, but their correlation
with the observed market falls short of the long-run model. In an attempt to specify a
model which is able to capture both correlation and volatility, I consider an economy in
which all three agents (long-term rational investors, rational speculators and contrarians)
are present:
yhat = G
rl
t y
rl
t +G
rs
t y
rs
t +G
cs
t y
cs
t , (21)
in which the subscript ha denotes heterogeneous agents. The fractions of each type of
agent are denoted by Glrt , G
sr
t and G
sc
t and are allowed to vary over time. This process of
switching between agent types or regimes is modeled based on evolutionary selection fol-
lowing Brock and Hommes (1998), such that the fraction of each type of agents increases
if its predictions outperform the other types. The predictions of each type are evaluated
by a measure of fitness representing the distance between the theoretical PD ratio and the
realized PD ratio in the previous period:
U jt = −
∥∥∥y jt−1− yt−1∥∥∥ j ∈ {rl,rs,cs} . (22)
The fractions of each type are then determined by multinomial logit probabilities:
G jt =
exp
(
β jU jt
)
∑
k
exp
(
β kUkt
) j,k ∈ {rl,rs,cs} , (23)
such that the fractions of the three types sum to one. The parameters β denote the in-
tensity of choice, which indicate the willingness of agents to switch between strategies.
While Brock and Hommes (1998) hold β constant across types, I allow for type-specific
intensities of choice. This setting accommodates the idea by Hong et al. (2007) that agents
15






   	    

y y{ha}
Figure 6: Observed PD ratio (yt) and theoretical PD ratio (yhat ), from heterogeneous agent model
(21), with ρ and β estimated by NLS (See Table 2). corr
(
yt ,yhat
)
= 0.759.
σ
(
yhat
)
σ (yt)
= 0.752.
may hold heterogeneous thresholds for switching between strategies.
To obtain estimates of β and ρ , I estimate the following model by nonlinear least
squares (NLS):
yt = yhat + εt . (24)
The top row of Table 2 shows the parameter estimates, while Figure 6 shows a plot of the
theoretical PD ratio yhat . The generated PD ratio is highly correlated with the realized PD
ratio; corr
(
yhat ,yt
)
= 0.759, which is of the same magnitude as the correlation coefficient
for the long-term model considered in Section 3. The volatility ratio for the heterogeneous
agent model is, however, much larger (σ
(
yhat
)
/σ (yt) = 0.752). Unlike the representative
agent models considered in Section 3, the heterogeneous agent model is able to explain
both the direction as well as the volatility of the observed PD ratio to a large extent.
The fitted values of model (24), ŷhat , are used to estimate the following regression by
OLS:
yt = φ ŷhat + εt . (25)
Table 2 reports the estimate and standard error of φ , showing that the null hypothesis that
φ = 1 can not be rejected.
In order to take into account the uncertainty underlying the estimated parameters in
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TABLE 2: Estimation results
ρ β1 β2 β3 φ σ
(
y jt
)
/σ(yt ) corr
(
yt ,y
j
t
)
R2
ha 0.966 0.799 5.175 1.125 0.962 0.752 0.759 0.548
(0.004) (0.599) (6.156) (0.401) (0.029)
rl 1.000 . . . 4.474 0.193 0.865 0.297
(0.073) (0.548)
rs 0.000 . . . 3.933 0.080 0.317 0.044
(0.000) (0.497)
cs 0.000 . . . 3.933 0.080 0.317 0.044
(0.202) (0.568)
Notes: NLS estimates and measures of fit for model (21)-(24). ha: Heterogeneous agents and evolutionary
dynamics (22)-(23). rl: Grlt = 1, G
rs
t = G
cs
t = 0. rs: G
rs
t = 1, G
rl
t = G
cs
t = 0. cs: G
cs
t = 1, G
rl
t = G
rs
t = 0. φ
is estimated by model (25). Annual data for 1872-2011. Standard errors (in in parentheses) are computed
using 10.000 bootstrap replications.
the VAR model (12), all standard errors in Table 2 are based on the following bootstrap
procedure:
1. Generate simultaneously an artificial series (T +100 observations) of dividend growth
rates from the VAR model (12) using the parameter estimates B̂, and an artificial se-
ries (T +100 observations) of PD ratios from the model (21)-(24) using the param-
eter estimates β̂ and ρ̂ . The innovations to both series are drawn (with re-sampling)
from the fitted residuals e′2ût and ε̂t .
2. Use the last T observations from both artificial series to estimate models (24) and
(25). Store the estimates β˜ , ρ˜ and φ˜ .
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 R times. For each parameter, the standard deviation of the R
artificial estimates is reported in Table 2 as the parameter’s standard error.
For this procedure, I set T = 138, equal to the sample size in the estimations, while the
number of replications R = 10.000.
Figure 7 shows the estimated fractions of each type of agent over time. Rational
long-term investors are always present in the economy, with their fraction of the total
population fluctuating for most of the time between roughly 40% and 100%. After 1950,
their fraction stays close to the lower bound of this interval, suggesting that expected
dividends have lost relevance as a determinant of asset prices. This is consistent with the
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Figure 7: Time-varying fractions of long-term investors (top), rational short-term investors (mid-
dle) and contrarians (bottom)
finding of decreasing dividend yields reported by Fama and French (2001). The fraction
of contrarians is relatively high during this period and increases further during the buildup
of the 1990s bubble. The fraction of rational speculators stays rather low during the entire
sample period.
Table 2 further shows estimates of the representative agent models considered in Sec-
tion 3, with the difference that the parameter ρ is now estimated using NLS. These mod-
els can be seen as a restricted version of the model (21)-(24). Instead of the evolutionary
dynamics (22)-(23), the fractions Grlt , G
rs
t and G
cs
t are restricted to either zero or one.
The parameters β therefore drop from the model. The correlation coefficients, volatil-
ity ratios and R2 reported in Table 2 suggest that the heterogeneous agent model is the
preferred specification. The long-term model generates a higher correlation coefficient
(corr
(
yrlt ,yt
)
> corr
(
yhat ,yt
)
) but in all other cases, the heterogeneous agent model gen-
erates higher correlation and volatility as well as a better fit in terms of R2. The null
hypothesis that φ = 1 is rejected for all three alternatives.
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The parameter ρ is estimated under the restriction 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. For the heterogeneous
agent model, the estimate of ρ is rather close to the calibration in Section 3. For the
representative agent models, however, a corner solution is reached with ρ estimated at
either zero or one. In the log-linear approximation by Campbell and Shiller (1988), the
parameter ρ represents the mean of the ratio PtPt+Dt . Of course, this mean can never be
zero or one as this implies that either prices or dividends are always equal to zero. It is
furthermore easy to see that the two speculative models (16) and (19) reduce to identical
models in which one-period dividend expectations are the sole determinant of prices in
the case that ρ = 0. The finding that highly unrealistic values of ρ are required to obtain
the best fit can be interpreted as an economic rejection of the three representative agent
models.
For a formal statistical comparison of the heterogeneous agent model and the three
representative agent models I rely on the test for nonnested nonlinear regression mod-
els developed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981). The test is based on the following
regression:
yt = (1−α)yH1t +α ŷH2t +ηt , (26)
in which yH1t and y
H2
t are two nonnested nonlinear regression models, such as the different
models considered above. The parameters of yH1t are estimated jointly with α by NLS,
while the test regression further includes the fitted values from NLS estimation of the
model yH2t . The hypothesis H0 : α = 0 is equivalent to the hypothesis that yH1t is the
correct data generating process. Table 3 shows the estimates and standard errors of α ,
from testing yhat against y
rl
t , y
rs
t and y
cs
t as well as vice-versa. The top row shows the result
when yH1t = y
ha
t . The hypothesis that y
ha
t is correct, can not be rejected against any of the
three alternatives. Moreover, the bottom row of Table 3 shows that the hypotheses that
yrlt , y
rs
t or y
cs
t are correct are all rejected against the alternative y
H2
t = y
ha
t .
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TABLE 3: Nonnested hypothesis tests
rl rs cs
H1: ha 0.792 0.611 0.611
(0.662) (4.468) (4.342)
H2: ha 0.787 0.927 0.927
(0.028) (0.024) (0.027)
Notes: NLS estimates of α in model (26). Top: yH1t = yhat and ŷH2t = ŷ
j
t , j ∈ {rl,rs,cs} . Bottom: yH1t = y jt ,
j ∈ {rl,rs,cs} and ŷH2t = ŷhat . Rejection of H0 : α = 0 implies rejection of yH1t (Davidson and MacKinnon,
1981). Annual data for 1872-2011. Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using 10.000 bootstrap
replications.
5 Time-varying discount factors
I have so far assumed a constant discount factor and, as a result, constant expected returns.
The log-linear approximation by Campbell and Shiller (1988) does, however, allow for
time-varying discount factors. If discount factors are allowed to vary over time, equation
(7) becomes (disregarding the constant term k):
yt = ρEt [yt+1]+Et [4dt+1]−Et [rt+1] . (27)
There are several ways to model time-varying discount factors. Campbell and Shiller
(1988) evaluate three simple specifications of the discount factors, based on short-term
interest rates, consumption and volatility of the S&P500 index, in addition to a constant
discount factor. With a time-varying discount factor, expected returns are computed as
follows:
Et [rt+1] = γEt [xt+1] , (28)
in which γ is the risk aversion coefficient and xt denotes interest rates, consumption or
volatility. In the first case, xt is the log-yield on Treasury Bills (T-bills), representing the
opportunity cost of capital. In the second case, xt is the log-growth rate of consumption,
such that the model (27) becomes an consumption-based asset pricing model with con-
stant relative-risk aversion utility function. In the third case, xt is the squared (lagged)
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log-return of the S&P500 index, as a simple measure of market volatility or risk.
The constant-discount factor is nested in the time-varying specifications. When γ = 0,
it is easily seen that the expected return drops out from equation (27), reducing it to the
constant discount factor models considered in the previous sections.
I evaluate the three specifications of the time-varying discount factor in the hetero-
geneous agent model (21). Following Campbell and Shiller (1988), I add xt as a third
variable to the VAR model (12), after which the long-term model (15) with time-varying
discount factor becomes:
yrlt =
∞
∑
i=0
ρ i (Et [4dt+1+i]−Et [rt+i+1]) =
(
e′2− γe′3
)
B(I−ρB)−1 zt , (29)
while the speculative models (16) and (19) become:
yrst =
ρ
1−ρEt [4pt+1]+Et [4dt+1]−
1
1−ρEt [rt+1] , (30)
and:
ycst =
ρ
1−ρ E˜
cs
t [4pt+1]+Et [4dt+1]−
1
1−ρEt [rt+1] , (31)
in which:
Et [rt+1] = γe′3Bzt . (32)
Due to limited data availability, the models with time-varying discount factors can be
estimated only for the period 1891-2009. Campbell and Shiller (1988) find that these three
time-varying discount factors are not helpful in explaining stock price movements in the
long-run model. The results presented in Table 4 confirm that this finding also holds for
the heterogeneous agent model considered here. Of the four specifications, the constant
discount factor is the preferred option. Table 4 shows the correlation, volatility ratio and
R2 for the estimated heterogeneous agent models (21) with different time-varying discount
factors as well as a constant discount factor over this period. The table further shows the
NLS estimate of the risk aversion coefficient γ . Using the discount factor based on either
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TABLE 4: Time-varying discount factors
γ σ
(
y jt
)
/σ(yt ) corr
(
yt ,y
j
t
)
R2
constant . 0.777 0.797 0.621
T-Bill -0.013 0.690 0.687 0.467
(0.304)
consumption 0.138 0.858 0.767 0.564
(0.210)
volatility 0.824 0.714 0.794 0.618
(0.157)
Notes: NLS estimates and measures of fit for model (21)-(24), with constant discount factor or time-varying
discount factor (28) based on interest rates, consumption or volatility. Annual data for 1891-2009. Standard
errors (in in parentheses) are computed using 10.000 bootstrap replications.
interest rates or consumption, the restriction γ = 0 (i.e. a constant discount factor) can
not be rejected. These specifications are therefore not preferred to the constant discount
factor model. Although the volatility ratio for the consumption based model is slightly
higher than with the constant discount factor, the latter yields a higher correlation and a
better fit overall.
In the case of a volatility-based discount factor, γ is significant, but Table 4 shows that
also this model is not an improvement in terms of correlation, volatility ratio or R2 with
respect to the constant discount factor model. Besides not improving the fit of the model
nor increasing the volatility of replicated prices, including a time-varying discount factor
based on volatility does not diminish the empirical need for heterogeneous horizons and
expectations. As Figure 8 shows, with a volatility-based discount factor the estimated
fractions of the different types evolve following a similar path as with a constant discount
factor (Figure 7). In fact, the estimated fraction of contrarians is often even higher than
with a constant discount factor.
Various more complex discount factor specifications, besides these three examples,
could be considered. As Cochrane (2011) argues, for any behavioral model there exists an
equivalent rational expectations model with time-varying discount factor. Nevertheless,
this does not imply that modeling discount factors instead of expectations is always the
most sensible strategy. The results presented in this paper show that a simple and straight-
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Figure 8: Time-varying fractions of long-term investors (top), rational short-term investors (mid-
dle) and contrarians (bottom), with volatility-based time-varying discount factor
forward extension (allowing for heterogeneous horizons and expectations) can generate
significantly more volatility than the linear present value model. Specifying a parametric
process for the evolution of a discount factor that is able to accomplishing the same re-
sult could instead be a rather complex task. The simple specifications considered in this
section are at least not adequate.
6 Conclusion
I build a nonlinear asset pricing model in which all agents form expectations based on
a VAR representation for price-dividend ratios and dividend growth rates. Based on the
performance of each strategy in the previous period, agents choose between a long-term
strategy, valuing asset based on expected dividends, and two types of short-term strategies,
valuing assets mainly based on expected price changes. This heterogeneous agent model
is able to generate far more volatile PD ratios than a standard present value model, thereby
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tackling a considerable part of the excess volatility puzzle.
The existence of speculators can explain the volatility of stock prices. Nevertheless,
heterogeneity in expectations among the speculators is required in order to approximate
observed prices in terms of volatility as well as correlation. In particular to replicate the
stock market during the 1990s accurately, a large fraction of market participants needs to
adopt contrarian beliefs. As this requires a deviation from the assumption of rationality, I
argue that the 1990s bubble was not a rational bubble.
The introduction of time-varying discount factors into the model does not significantly
alter the results. Overall, the results suggest that observed excess volatility with respect to
the standard present value model is better explained by nonstandard expectations rather
than by time-varying discount factors.
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